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rules—their dependence on a particular model
specification.
Two building blocks are required to define a
targeting rule: a macro model and an objective
(loss) function for the central bank. The model of
this article consists of two equations representing
the aggregate demand and aggregate supply behav-
ior. It is a semi-structural model that allows for
both backward-looking and forward-looking
dynamics on inflation and the output gap while
retaining much of the flavor of the New Keynesian
model.1 As for the central-bank loss function, it
implies that monetary policy targets the volatilities
of inflation, the output gap, and the nominal inter-
est rate. This loss function is not directly obtained
from any welfare criterion and simply represents
the task of macro stabilization frequently assigned
to central banks. A fully fledged (New Keynesian)
model should be introduced to calculate its
T
he introduction of the so-called target-
ing rules in articles such as Svensson
(1999) and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler
(1999) represented a keystone for mone-
tary policy analysis. A targeting rule is obtained
by solving a central-bank optimization program
that includes both an objective (loss) function and
a single model describing the economy. There-
fore, targeting rules have two major characteristics
for monetary policy: They represent first-order
optimality conditions for the central bank, and
they rely on the particular model used to describe
macroeconomic fluctuations. Targeting rules have
probably received so much attention because of
their first characteristic: They entail an optimal
behavior for the central bank. The optimality
property brought about insightful discussions on
the convenience of a commitment-type decision
process (see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1999;
Woodford, 1999; and Svensson, 2002). This article
focuses on the second characteristic of targeting
This article first explores the implications of model specification on the design of targeting rules
in a world of model certainty. As a general prescription, a targeting rule must counterbalance the
private-sector dynamics: The more backward-looking behavior is observed in either the output
gap or inflation, the more forward-looking monetary policy should be. Likewise, a more forward-
looking economy would require stronger backward-looking reactions of the nominal interest rate
to the output gap or inflation. The article also analyzes the effects of implementing monetary policy
in an environment with uncertainty. Our results indicate that a simple model-invariant rule of
the style proposed by Taylor (1993) performs better than a model-dependent targeting rule in the
presence of moderate parameter uncertainty. (JEL E52)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, September/October 2006, 88(5), pp. 451-69.
1 See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) for a New Keynesian
large model that incorporates backward-looking features.
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 welfare-theoretic targeting rule, which unfortu-
nately goes beyond the scope of this article.2
The analysis will be executed in three steps.
In the next section, the targeting rule is derived
and, after some algebra, presented as an interest
rate optimal reaction function. This optimized
interest rate rule provides response coefficients
of the nominal interest rate to its own lags or leads
and to other key variables such as inflation or the
output gap. In the second step, in the following
section, a baseline calibration is proposed, borrow-
ing estimates from the New Keynesian literature.
In turn, the calibrated model is able to replicate
many regularities observed in second-moment
statistics from actual data. Finally, the third step
consists of looking at how the optimal response
coefficients change when the model parameters
vary.
As one alternative to targeting rules, the
famous Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) is an example
of model-invariant monetary policy design. The
Taylor rule is a simple rule (also called instrument
rule) characterized by general policy prescriptions:
The nominal interest rate should be raised (low-
ered) when inflation is above (below) its target
value, when output is above (below) its potential
level, or when the previous nominal interest is
above (below) its target value. Thus, it can be said
that a Taylor rule is a model-invariant policy rule
because its formulation is not based on any spe-
cific model. In spite of being suboptimal, model-
invariant rules have one advantage over targeting
rules: Their stabilizing performance is more robust
to model changes than model-dependent targeting
rules (Levin and Williams, 2003).
The final section of this article studies the
convenience of using a model-independent rule
when there is uncertainty surrounding the true
value of the model parameters. The presence of
uncertainty may discourage the implementation
of a targeting rule in favor of a model-independent
rule. Some examples of parameter misidentifica-
tion will recommend that the central bank choose
a model-invariant rule (a Taylor-type rule) for its
better stabilizing performance.
TARGETING RULES
As mentioned in the introduction, a targeting
rule is built on two blocks: the model that repre-
sents the economic behavior of the private sector
and the central-bank loss function that incorpo-
rates the objectives (or targets) of monetary policy.
Regarding the model, the following aggregate
demand–aggregate supply, (AD)-(AS), pair of
equations determine the dynamic behavior of the
output gap (yt) and inflation (πt):
(AD)
(AS)    
where 0.0 # θ0; φ0 # 1.0; θ1, φ1 > 0.0; Rt is the
nominal interest rate; and both υt and εt are white-
noise shocks with constant standard deviations,
συ and σε. Note that Et denotes the rational expec-
tations operator conditional to information avail-
able in period t. The output gap, yt, is defined by
the fractional difference between current output
and potential output.3 This (AD)-(AS) model has
been recently used in work such as Smets (2003),
Moreno (2004), Lindé (2005), and Moessner
(2005). The AD curve negatively relates fluctua-
tions of the output gap to the real interest rate in
a way that conveys both backward-looking and
forward-looking behavior. External habit forma-
tion in households’ utility function can explain
the introduction of the backward-looking term yt–1
as first pointed out by Fuhrer (2000). Meanwhile,
the rate of inflation evolves in accordance with
the AS curve, which may represent the presence
of staggered price contracts as in Fuhrer and Moore
(1995). Alternatively, the AS curve is similar to
the inflation equation obtained when extending
the sticky-price model described by Calvo (1983)
to allow price indexation of nonoptimal prices
on the previous observation of inflation as in
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). The
πφ π φ π φ ε tt t t t t Ey = +− + + −+ 0 10 1 1 1 () ,
yy E y R E t tt t t t t t =+ − − − + − ++ θθ θ π υ 0 10 1 1 1 1 () ( ) ,
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2 Woodford (2003a) shows the welfare-theoretic loss functions
implied by various specifications of the New Keynesian model.
Moreover, Levin et al. (2006) and Casares (2006), respectively,
characterize a welfare-theoretic targeting rule using a New
Keynesian model for the United States and the euro area.
3 The model abstracts from the way potential output is calculated
because it is not relevant for the purposes of this article.selection of this model can be justified on the
following basis:
• Simple model: Two dynamic equations
representing AD and AS behavior. The
simplicity of the model will permit us to
write the targeting rule as an interest-rate
reaction function.
• Semi-structural equations: The pair 
(AD)-(AS) shows a number of similarities
to the behavioral equations obtained in a
closed-economy New Keynesian model
with consumption external habit formation,
Calvo-style sticky prices, and price index-
ation on lagged inflation as pointed out by
Smets (2003) and Moreno (2004). However,
it must be recognized that it does not accu-
rately represent any particular micro-
founded economy.4
• The pair (AD)-(AS) collects a broad variety
of model specifications. The values for θ0
and φ0 ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 can reproduce
from purely backward-looking to com-
pletely forward-looking dynamics for the
output gap and inflation (and all the cases
in between). Thus, the fully forward-looking
New Keynesian economy is depicted by
the case θ0 = φ0 = 0.0, which has been used
in articles such as Clarida, Galí, and Gertler
(1999), McCallum (2003), Woodford
(2003b), and Preston (2006). The purely
backward-looking model (θ0 = φ0 = 1.0) is
less frequently found in the literature
(e.g., see Söderström, 2002, and Svensson,
2003).5
Turning to the second building block for a
targeting rule, let us suppose that the central bank
pursues a monetary policy that aims at reducing
variability of inflation, the output gap, and the
nominal interest rate. This is a common assump-
tion in the literature on monetary policy rules
(Smets, 2003; Giannoni and Woodford, 2003;
Woodford, 2003b; and Moessner, 2005) and may be
considered a realistic ad hoc way of introducing
the central bank’s stabilizing preference. Neglect-
ing constant terms (or setting them to zero), the
loss function for the central bank in period t is
therefore
(L)                    
with γy and γR being nonnegative values that
define the relative weights on the central bank’s
stabilizing preference.
The targeting rule is going to be derived
using the timeless perspective approach defined
by Woodford (1999, p. 18) and, in a more formal
manner, in Woodford (2003a, pp. 538-39). The
timeless perspective implies that the first-order
conditions of the central bank do not depend on
the moment of time in which they are set. In other
words, they do not change over time and the
central bank’s behavior is time consistent. Regard-
ing its practical calculation, the timeless perspec-
tive commitment is obtained by considering that
the macro relationships involved in the model
hold in all the periods (past, current, and future).
This makes the timing of the decision irrelevant.
Accordingly, the optimal monetary policy is
then designed by minimizing 
where β < 1.0 is the discount factor, subject to
(AD)-(AS) relationships in periods t+j with 
j [ (...,–2,–1,0,1,2,...). The first-order conditions




(TR.3)                  
where λt and ξt are the Lagrange multipliers
associated with (AD) and (AS), respectively.
Now we will make substitutions in (TR.1)-(TR.3)
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4 In addition, the stochastic terms appearing in (AD) and (AS) have
no direct link to structural shocks.
5 One notices that the backward-looking (AD)-(AS) case can also be
interpreted as a vector autoregression (VAR)-type representation
of the economy and therefore can relate it to the literature on
structural VAR models. See, e.g., Galí (1992) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers. After the
algebra,
The above expression can be rearranged so as to
reach the following optimal reaction function of
the central bank in terms of the nominal interest
rate:
(TR) 
The derivation of (TR) represents a bridge
between targeting rules and instrument rules that
could help to close the gap opened by Svensson
(2003).6 It is easy to notice that (TR) recalls the
instrument-style of a Taylor rule with similar
prescriptions: The nominal interest rate must
respond positively to current deviations of infla-
tion from target (µ6 > 0.0) and to the current output
gap (µ8 > 0.0). In some sense, (TR) can also be
considered an instrument rule because it provides
an operational reaction function for the central
bank as advocated by McCallum (1999).7 Besides,
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shocks, which makes it robust to any assumption
on their generating process.8 Nevertheless, it looks
much more complex than a Taylor-type rule with
regard to the internal dynamic structure. There
are two lags (Rt–2 and Rt–1), two leads (EtRt+1 and
EtRt+2), and the expected value of the current
interest rate computed in the past period (Et–1Rt).
Moreover, one lag and one lead of the output gap
(yt–1 and Etyt+1) also appear in (TR).
Accordingly, (TR) implies that optimal mone-
tary policy must combine backward-looking and
forward-looking dynamics for the nominal interest
rate. This represents a more general case than the
optimal instrument-style rule derived by Giannoni
and Woodford (2003) in a forward-looking model,
which included only backward-looking terms.
Note that the backward-looking parameters from
the (AD)-(AS) equations, θ0 and φ0, take part in
the determination of all the optimal µ’s reaction
coefficients for the targeting rule (TR). Therefore
the degree of backward-looking behavior in the
dynamics of either the output gap or inflation is
key for the optimal design of monetary policy.
This point will be further investigated here in
future sections.
Finally, the influence of the central bank’s
policy parameters, γy and γR, in the design of (TR)
is found only in the size of the responses of the
nominal interest rate to the output gap terms (both
parameters) and to inflation (only γR). In other
words, the value of either γy or γR is irrelevant for
the determination of the coefficients on the lags
and leads of Rt in (TR). These coefficients (from
µ1 to µ5) are completely determined by the param-
eters that appear in the (AD)-(AS) equations, plus β.
BASELINE CALIBRATION
A baseline calibration is required to establish
a benchmark reference for the analysis conducted
below. The calibration procedure taken is simple:
Choose some arbitrary values borrowed from the
underlying micro structure of the New Keynesian
model and check their empirical fit. However, the
calibration is not intended to match data from any
Casares
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6 See McCallum and Nelson (2005) and Svensson (2005) for further
insightful discussions on the use of targeting rules versus instru-
ment rules.
7 Assuming that the output gap were observable.
8 Giannoni and Woodford (2002) support the use of targeting rules
because they are independent from the nature of the model’s shocks.particular economy. We will show just that the
empirical properties of the model may resemble
second-moment statistics observed in actual data.
Table 1 displays the numerical values of the
baseline calibration. Both the (AD) and (AS) curves
evenly feature backward- and forward-looking
dynamics (θ0= φ0= 0.5). The (AD) curve with 
θ0= 0.5 corresponds to a New Keynesian economy
featuring strong habit formation on households’
consumption preferences as advocated by Fuhrer
(2000).9 Likewise, having φ0= 0.5 in the (AS) equa-
tion implies that there is full indexation of non-
optimal prices to lagged inflation as estimated
in Woodford (2003a, Chap. 5) or Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). Remarkably, the
equal-weight calibration used here is consistent
with the numerical estimates reported by Smets
(2003) using euro area data and by Moreno (2004)
for the U.S. economy.10
Regarding the slope coefficients, we set 
θ1= 0.06 in the (AD) curve while φ1= 0.01 in the
(AS) curve. The value for the (AD) slope is found
in a New Keynesian model with a habit-formation
coefficient equal to 0.8 and a relative risk aversion
coefficient for consumption in the utility function
equal to 2.0. The calibrated (AS) slope, φ1= 0.01,
is very close to the slope of the hybrid New
Keynesian Phillips curve from a sticky-price
model à la Calvo, where firms adjust prices opti-
mally once per year on average and index them
to lagged inflation in periods without optimal
adjustment.11
The model was solved with two alternative
monetary policy rules: the optimal (TR) derived
above and the Taylor-type rule with interest-rate
smoothing12:
(TayR)   
with the original numbers proposed in Taylor
(1993), µπ= 1.5 and µy= 0.5 together with a signifi-
cant degree of interest-rate smoothing, µR= 0.80.
Regarding the calibration of (TR), the µ’s coeffi-
cients depend on the values already assigned to
θ0, θ1, φ0, and φ1 plus on the central bank parame-
ters, β, γy, and γR. The discount factor takes the
standard value β = 0.99, which implies a 4 percent
annualized rate of discount. For the parameters
on the central-bank stabilizing preference, we set
γy = 0.04 and γR = 0.30, which reflects a monetary
policy that is more concerned with stabilizing
inflation than the output gap or the nominal
interest rate.13
The (percent) standard deviations of the
stochastic disturbances are συ = 0.6 and σε = 0.2
because they let the model have realistic volatili-
ties in the output gap, inflation, and the nominal
interest rate. Table 2 gives a comparison between
some second-moment statistics obtained in our
calibrated model under both (TR) and (TayR) and
numbers obtained for the United States, the euro
area, the United Kingdom, and Japan.14 Four
Ry R t Rt
y
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9 As the external habit-formation coefficient approaches 1.0, the
New Keynesian model delivers an (AD) curve with θ0 = 0.5.
10 Nevertheless, the degree of backward-lookingness of U.S. inflation
has been subject to controversy. Galí and Gertler (1999) claim that
inflation responds strongly to future developments (φ0 < 0.5), while
Lindé (2005) finds the opposite result (φ0 > 0.5).
11 Under the common assumption of constant capital, the slope of
the Phillips curve also depends on the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity and
the elasticity of the real marginal costs with respect to output. Our
choice of φ1 = 0.01 is obtained when the former is 6 and the latter
is 0.56, as in Amato and Laubach (2003), Woodford (2003a, Chap.
5), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
12 The output gap coefficient must be divided by 4 to assimilate Taylor
(1993) coefficients because they were proposed for a rule based 
on annual observations, whereas our model provides quarterly
observations.
13 These loss function weights are similar to those used by Giannoni
and Woodford (2003).
14 The data are quarterly observations for the United States, the euro
area, the United Kingdom, and Japan during the period 1980:Q1–
2004:Q4. The rate of inflation is the annualized growth rate of the
GDP deflator from the previous quarter except for the case of the
United Kingdom, which is the annualized growth rate of the retail
price index. The output gap has been computed by taking off a linear
trend from the logarithm of the real GDP except for the case of Japan,
which was obtained from a quadratic detrending due to its structural
break on long-run growth. The nominal interest rate is the annual-
ized rate of return on a comparable short-run risk-free bond. (Source: 
Table 1
Baseline Calibration
AD curve θ0 = 0.5 θ1 = 0.06 συ = 0.6
AS curve  φ0 = 0.5 φ1 = 0.01 σε = 0.2
TayR µπ = 1.5 µy = 0.5 µR = 0.80
TR γy = 0.04 γR = 0.30 β = 0.99business cycle regularities can be extracted from
observing the columns of actual data:
• The variabilities of the rate of inflation, the
output gap, and the nominal interest rate
are not very different. Their annualized
standard deviations mostly are between 2
percent and 3 percent. The nominal interest
rate seems to have a higher standard devia-
tion relative to the other two variables.
• There is a weakly positive correlation
between the output gap and either inflation
or the nominal interest rate.
• There is a strongly positive correlation
between the rate of inflation and the nomi-
nal interest rate.
• The three variables have high coefficients
of autocorrelation.
As documented in Table 2, the calibrated
model with (TayR) provides second-moment
statistics that never deviate significantly from the
numbers obtained in the data. It could be said that
it correctly replicates the data regularities that we
just mentioned. The calibrated model with the
optimal rule (TR) provides statistics of similar
magnitude to the data in many cases, although it
does not reproduce correctly two of the correla-
tions found in the data. The nominal interest rate
has a slightly negative coefficient of correlation
with output (slightly positive in the data) and also
quite a low positive correlation with the rate of
inflation (strongly positive correlation in the data).
Table 2 also shows that the performance of the
calibrated (TayR) is not dramatically worse than
the performance under the calibrated optimal
policy (TR). The higher standard deviations of
the target variables when applying (TayR) are
between 5 and 22 percent higher than those
obtained when using (TR).
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS IN A
WELL-SPECIFIED MODEL...
This section addresses the implications of
alternative specifications of the four (AD)-(AS)
model parameters (θ0, θ1, φ0, and φ1) and the central-
bank policy weights (γy and γR). In particular, we
will examine how a change in each parameter
from the baseline calibration reshapes the µ’s
coefficients on the optimal policy rule (TR).
Let us start by discussing the consequences
Casares
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Table 2
Business Cycle Statistics: Baseline Calibrated Model vs. Data
Model with  Model with 
(TayR) (TR) United States Euro area United Kingdom Japan
Standard deviations (annualized, %)
π 2.88 2.36 1.98 2.78 3.63 2.58
y 2.21 1.92 2.05 1.75 2.28 2.88
R 3.29 3.12 3.07 3.62 3.38 3.15
Coefficients of correlation
(y,π) 0.38 0.19 0.04 0.04 0.20 0.28
(y,R) 0.20 –0.04 0.11 0.24 0.28 0.31
(π,R) 0.80 0.35 0.78 0.88 0.84 0.77
Coefficients of autocorrelation
π 0.86 0.83 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.54
y 0.86 0.80 0.92 0.95 0.94 0.95
R 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97
International Financial Statistics, August 2005, International
Monetary Fund, except for U.K. real GDP and inflation, which were
obtained from the National Statistics Office of the U.K. government,
available at www.statistics.gov.uk.)of altering the backward-looking coefficients, θ0
and φ0, from their lower bound (0.0) to their upper
bound (1.0). Results are plotted in Figure 1. The
solid lines of Figure 1 show the impact of changing
the degree of backward-looking behavior on the
output gap (θ0), whereas the dotted lines represent
the influence when increasing the backward-
looking pattern of inflation (φ0). The intersection
of the two lines provides the optimal coefficients
under the baseline calibration at θ0= φ0= 0.5.
As displayed in Figure 1, the degree of 
backward-lookingness of both the output gap and
inflation plays a crucial role on the design of the
targeting rule. Any change in either θ0 or φ0 affects
all the nine µ’s coefficients that enter (TR). Further-
more, both θ0 and φ0 shape the internal dynamics
of (TR) in a similar way. Thus, an increase in either
θ0or φ0would lead to a decrease in the coefficients
on lagged nominal interest rates (µ1 and µ2) and,
also, an increase in the coefficients on future
nominal interest rates (µ4 and µ5). The latter
assessment must be understood in terms of the
absolute value of the coefficients because both µ1
and µ5 are negative coefficients.
Thus, there is a well-marked link between the
model structure and optimal monetary policy:
A more backward-looking economy requires a
more forward-looking monetary policy rule. In
a symmetric manner, an economy with deep 
forward-looking dynamics should have persistent
inertia in the implementation of monetary policy.
Remarkably, this “counterbalance assignment” is
applicable to the internal structure of either the
output gap or inflation. This finding represents a
significant extension of a similar result reported
by Leitemo (2006) restricted to the relationship
between optimal policy and inflation dynamics.15
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µ1, Rt–2 µ2, Rt–1 µ3, Et–1Rt
µ4, EtRt+1 µ5, EtRt+2 µ6, πt
µ7, yt–1 µ8, yt µ9, Etyt+1
Figure 1
Coefficients of the Targeting Rule (TR) Depending on the Backward-Looking Parameters of the
(AD) Equation, θ0, and the (AS) Equation, φ0
15 As another difference from Leitemo (2006), our central bank loss
function is also more general because it incorporates interest-rate
targeting.For illustrative purposes, Table 3 contains the
values of the (TR) coefficients for alternative speci-
fications of both θ0 and φ0. The purely forward-
looking economy (θ0= φ0= 0.0) would have the
highest lagged nominal interest rate coefficients
(µ1 = –1.02 and µ2 = 2.02) and no reaction to the
expected future nominal interest rates (µ4 = µ5 =
0.0). By contrast, a purely backward-looking econ-
omy (θ0= φ0= 1.0) would have an optimal policy
with strong reactions to expected future develop-
ments (µ4 = 1.98 and µ5 = –0.98) and practically
no dependence on past movements (µ1 = 0.0 and
µ2 . 0.0).
Figure 1 and Table 3 also inform about the
impact of changing either θ0 or φ0 on the optimal
coefficients that measure the reaction to changes
in inflation or the output gap. Interestingly, the
coefficient that gives the optimal reaction to infla-
tion is quite robust to changes in either θ0 or φ0,
because it always takes a rather low value 
(µ6 = 0.0016 at the baseline calibration). The
reaction to the output gap is stronger than the
reaction to inflation (contradicting the original
Taylor prescription), with a value µ8 = 0.0064
under the baseline calibration.16 The output gap
coefficient is affected in a different way by changes
in θ0 and φ0. If the output gap dynamics were
more backward-looking (higher θ0), the optimal
policy would react more strongly to the output gap
(higher µ8). The reverse is observed (lower µ8)
when inflation has a greater backward-looking
component (higher φ0); the optimal policy will
respond less aggressively to the output gap. Fur-
thermore, the response coefficient to the lagged
output gap (µ7) will significantly decrease in
absolute value.
Let us turn to discuss the implications of
changes in the slope parameters, θ1 and φ1
(Figure 2). As implied by the definition of the µ’s
in (TR), there is very little impact of either θ1 or
φ1 on the structure of lags and leads.17 The only
coefficient of this type that is affected by the slope
coefficients is µ2, which is the one giving reactions
to Rt–1. Nevertheless, the value of µ2 is rather
insensitive to changes in the slope coefficients
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16 Actually, it can be observed from (TR) that (µ6/µ8) = (φ1/γy). The
baseline calibration implies φ1 < γy, which gives rise to an optimal 
Table 3
Targeting Rule Coefficients under Alternative Model Specifications for θ0 and φ0
µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4 µ5 µ6 µ7 µ8 µ9
Baseline –0.20 0.81 –0.20 0.79 –0.20 0.0016 –0.0032 0.0064 –0.0032
(θ0 = 0.5, φ0 = 0.5)
Forward-looking output gap –0.34 1.01 0.0 0.33 0.0 0.0013 –0.0027 0.0053 –0.0026
(θ0 = 0.0, φ0 = 0.5)
Forward-looking inflation –0.51 1.52 –0.50 0.49 0.0 0.0020 –0.0081 0.0080 0.0
(θ0 = 0.5, φ0 = 0.0)
Purely forward-looking –1.02 2.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0020 –0.0081 0.0080 0.0
(θ0 = 0.0, φ0 = 0.0)
Backward-looking output gap 0.0 0.51 –0.50 1.49 –0.49 0.0020 –0.0040 0.0080 –0.0040
(θ0 = 1.0, φ0 = 0.5)
Backward-looking inflation 0.0 0.34 0.0 0.99 –0.33 0.0013 0.0 0.0053 –0.0053
(θ0 = 0.5, φ0 = 1.0)
Purely backward-looking 0.0 0.0006 0.0 1.98 –0.98 0.0020 0.0 0.0080 –0.0079
(θ0 = 1.0, φ0 = 1.0)
policy with larger reactions to the output gap than to inflation. To
reverse this result, either the slope of the Phillips curve should
increase (higher φ1) or the central bank should have a weaker 
stabilizing preference for the output gap (lower γy).
17 The reaction to changes in φ1 is not visible in some of the cases
plotted in Figure 2 because it overlaps the reaction to changes in
θ1. In turn, both reactions are null (flat lines) and indistinguishable.because it moves only within a very narrow range
when altering φ1 from 0.0 to 1.0 (between 0.80
and 0.86 as shown in Figure 2). The impact of
different settings for θ1 or φ1 on the other optimal
coefficients of (TR) are also displayed in Figure 2.
A higher AD curve slope (θ1) entails higher respon-
siveness of the optimal policy to inflation devia-
tions and the current output gap (higher µ6 and
µ8). In addition, the reaction to both the past and
expected future output gap would also be more
significant (higher µ7 and µ9 in absolute value).
Regarding the slope of the AS curve (φ1), it deter-
mines only the coefficients on inflation and the
lagged nominal interest rate (see Figure 2). Both
coefficients (µ6 and µ2) are positively affected by
a higher φ1.
Finally, it can be observed in (TR) that the
parameters that provide the central-bank stabiliz-
ing preference, γy and γR, also play some role in
the design of the optimal coefficients. In particular,
their values have influence on the way the optimal
policy should respond to inflation (µ6) and the
output gap terms (µ7, µ8, and µ9) because the coef-
ficients on the internal dynamics of the nominal
interest rate (from µ1to µ5) do not depend on either
γy or γR. Figure 3 shows the reaction of the µ’s
coefficients (if any).18 When the preference for
stabilizing the output gap rises (higher γy), the
reactions of the nominal interest rate involving
output gap terms become more significant as
implied by a higher (absolute) value of the coeffi-
cients µ7, µ8, and µ9. The inflation coefficient µ6 is
not affected by a change in γy. In the case of a
central bank more oriented to stabilizing the
nominal interest rate (higher γR), the inflation
and output gap coefficients lose ground rapidly.
As shown in Figure 3, they approach zero as γR
increases.
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Figure 2
Coefficients of the Targeting Rule (TR) Depending on the Slope Parameters of the (AD) 
Equation, θ1, and the (AS) Equation, φ1
18 Note that the reactions overlap in many cases displayed in Figure 3
because there is no influence from either γy or γR.Summarizing, the backward-looking coeffi-
cients of the (AD)-(AS) structure are of great
importance for the computation of the optimal
interest-rate reaction function. A counterbalance
assignment for optimal policy was issued: More
backward-lookingness in the economy would
lead to more forward-lookingness in monetary
policy actions and vice versa. The slope coeffi-
cients matter only for the size of the responses to
changes in the output gap or inflation. Thus, the
slope of the (AD) curve has a positive impact on
the reactions to inflation and the output gap while
the slope of the (AS) curve exerts a positive impact
only on the first of the two. The central-bank
stabilizing preference, expressed by the weights
of its target variables in (L), also plays a role in
the determination of the optimal reaction to
inflation and the output gap.
...AND IN A MIS-SPECIFIED
MODEL
The analysis of the previous section was
done assuming that the central bank was able to
correctly identify the parameters of the (AD)-(AS)
relationships. However, this is something that
should not be taken for granted, because the cen-
tral bank may make a mistake when estimating
the true values of the parameters. Here, we will
assume that the central bank feels confident about
the canonical (AD)-(AS) model as a good represen-
tation of the economy but some identification
error may arise when estimating θ0, θ1, φ0, or φ1.
Perhaps the central bank should no longer apply
(TR) because its optimality vanishes if the model
parameters are wrongly identified. In other words,
the possibility of generating macroeconomic
instability may discourage the central bank from
using the model-dependent (TR). Alternatively,
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µ1, Rt–2 µ2, Rt–1 µ3, Et–1Rt
µ4, EtRt+1 µ5, EtRt+2 µ6, πt
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Figure 3
Coefficients of the Targeting Rule (TR) Depending on the Central-Bank Stabilizing Preference
Parameters, γy and γRthe central bank could rely on a model-invariant
policy rule, such as the Taylor-type rule (TayR),
for example. This issue is going to be examined
in exercises of policy simulation assuming either
one or two mistakes in the identification of the
(AD)-(AS) model parameters.
Our first simulation exercise consists of evalu-
ating the performance of the (TR) when the central
bank makes only one mistake in the identification
of the model parameters. More concretely, it is
supposed that the true parameters are those of
the baseline calibration (Table 1) and the central
bank is capable of correctly identifying all of them
except one. To measure the stabilizing perform-
ance, we compute the standard deviations of the
target variables and compare them with those
obtained if the model parameters had been suc-
cessfully identified. In addition, the unconditional
expectation of the central-bank loss function (L)
will also be computed to provide an overall per-
formance mark. This (long-run) loss value has
been used to rank alternative monetary policy
rules in recent work such as Levin and Williams
(2003), Adalid et al. (2005), Smets (2003), Walsh
(2005), Casares (2006), and Coenen (2006).
Table 4 reports several cases of the perform-
ance of (TR) with one identification mistake. The
results are expressed in relative terms with respect
to both the well-identified (optimal) targeting
rule and the calibrated Taylor-type rule (TayR).19
The former will tell us the deviation from optimal-
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Table 4
Stabilizing Performance of (TR) with One Mistake on Parameter Identification
Relative to Either Optimal Policy (denoted by superscript *) or Taylor Rule (denoted by superscript TayR)











Mistake in θ0, error in parentheses
θ0 = 0.0  (–0.50)  1.65 1.52 0.47 1.35 1.32 0.44 1.96 1.45
θ0 = 0.25 (–0.25) 1.34 1.30 0.60 1.10 1.13 0.57 1.39 1.03
θ0 = 0.75 (+0.25) 1.17 0.87 1.21 0.96 0.76 1.15 1.26 0.93
θ0 = 1.0 (+0.50) 1.44 0.90 1.35 1.18 0.78 1.28 1.73 1.28
Mistake in φ0, error in parentheses
φ0 = 0.0 (–0.50)  1.53 1.18 0.65 1.25 1.03 0.62 1.62 1.20
φ0 = 0.25 (–0.25)  1.33 1.16 0.66 1.09 1.01 0.63 1.32 0.98
φ0 = 0.75 (+0.25)  1.43 0.93 1.14 1.17 0.81 1.08 1.58 1.27
φ0 = 1.0 (+0.50)  1.82 1.01 1.30 1.49 0.88 1.23 2.37 1.75
Mistake in θ1, error in parentheses
θ1 = 0.02 (–0.04)  1.24 1.10 0.76 1.01 0.96 0.72 1.21 0.90
θ1 = 0.10 (+0.04)  0.94 0.99 1.18 0.77 0.86 1.12 1.04 0.77
θ1 = 0.15 (+0.09)  0.90 1.01 1.37 0.74 0.88 1.30 1.13 0.84
θ1 = 0.50 (+0.44)  0.85 1.14 2.22 0.70 0.99 2.11 1.97 1.46
Mistake in φ1, error in parentheses
φ1 = 0.001 (–0.009)  1.59 1.09 0.89 1.30 0.95 0.84 1.77 1.31
φ1 = 0.02 (+0.01)  0.92 1.07 1.24 0.75 0.93 1.18 1.09 0.81
φ1 = 0.06 (+0.05)  0.91 1.47 2.17 0.74 1.28 2.06 2.16 1.60
φ1 = 0.25 (+0.24)  2.34 4.14 6.88 1.91 3.60 6.52 19.28 14.28
19 The numerical values of the annualized percent standard devia-
tions with the well-identified (TR) and (TayR) were reported in
Table 2.ity, and the latter will tell us the deviation from
applying a model-independent simple rule such
as (TayR). The first line of Table 4 shows what
happens when the central bank mistakenly
believes that the output gap is purely forward-
looking and sets θ0 = 0.0 instead of its true value,
θ0 = 0.5. This mistake will make the policy rule
much more backward-looking as the lagged coef-
ficients, µ1 and µ2, gain significance; whereas, the
lead coefficients, µ4 and µ5, lose significance. As
a consequence, the inflation standard deviation
will be 65 percent higher than that obtained with
the optimal policy (σπ
TR/σπ * = 1.65), the output
gap standard deviation will be 52 percent higher
(σy
TR/σy * = 1.52), and the interest-rate volatility
will drop by more than one-half (σR
TR/σR * = 0.47).
Moreover, the calibrated (TayR) outperforms the
(TR) with that mistake because the variabilities
of inflation and the output gap are significantly
higher with the latter (σπ
TR/σπ
TayR = 1.35 and
σy
TR/σy
TayR = 1.32). In loss-value terms, it is
reported L
TR/L* = 1.96 and L
TR/L
TayR = 1.45, which
means that the incorrect identification of θ0 gives
rise to a 96 percent higher loss value compared
with the optimal (TR) and still a higher 45 percent
loss value in comparison with (TayR). In this par-
ticular example the identification mistake gives
rise to a substantial worsening of monetary policy
performance with (TR), which leads us to recom-
mend its replacement by the model-independent
(TayR). With smaller deviations of the specified
θ0 from the true parameter such as θ0 = 0.25 or θ0
= 0.75, the misspecified targeting rule provides a
stabilizing performance closer to the well-specified
Casares
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Performance of Targeting Rules When One Parameter Is Mistakenly Identifiedtargeting rule, although it still provides significant
differences in the standard deviations of the target
variables and the loss function (see Table 4).
Figure 4 contains graphs of the loss value ratio
L
TR/L* for different model misidentifications. The
upper-left graph represents the case of an identi-
fication mistake on the output gap backward-
looking coefficient θ0. The value of L
TR/L* has a
minimal value of 1 when there is no identification
mistake (θ0 = 0.5) and starts rising when the value
of θ0 deviates to the right or the left. There is a
horizontal dotted line that marks the ratio obtained
with the implementation of the model-invariant
(TayR). The overall performance of (TayR) is better
than the mistakenly identified (TR) when the solid
line is above the dotted line. For a mistake in θ0,
(TayR) happens to be preferred when θ0 takes a
value either lower than 0.28 or higher than 0.80.
Let us define that interval as the “allowance
interval” to keep the wrongly identified (TR)
over the calibrated (TayR).20 As shown in Table 5,
the central bank can make an identifying mistake
in the range θ0 [ [0.28, 0.80] and still carry out a
monetary policy with stabilizing performance
superior to that of the calibrated (TayR).
Results are alike if the backward-looking
coefficient of inflation, φ0, is incorrectly identified.
The stabilizing capacity of the mistakenly iden-
tified (TR) is poor when the identification error
is of large magnitude (see lines with φ0 = 0.0 or
φ0 = 1.0 in Table 4). The upper-right graph of
Figure 4 shows that the wrong φ0 must lie inside
the range φ0 [ [0.24, 0.67] to yield a loss value
lower than the one produced by applying the
calibrated (TayR). Precisely, this is the allowance
interval for a mistake in φ0 reported in Table 5.
Table 4 and Figure 4 also show the perform-
ance of (TR) if the identification mistake is made
in one of the slope coefficients, θ1 or φ1. When
looking at the bottom panels of Figure 4, one
can clearly observe that a good identification for
the slope coefficient of the (AS) equation φ1 is
required to avoid bad policies, whereas the (AD)
slope coefficient θ1 seems to be less important.
(Note how quickly the loss value ratio rises when
φ1 deviates from its true value of 0.01.) A slight
mistake such as setting φ1 = 0.02 instead of  φ1 =
0.01 would result in nearly a 10 percent higher
loss value (see Table 4). With a higher mistake
(φ1 = 0.06), the standard deviations and the loss
value change substantially, relative to the optimal
policy. Moreover, the loss value ratio relative to
(TayR) is 1.60, which means that (TayR) would
clearly outperform a (TR) holding this identifica-
tion error. By contrast, the (AD) slope, θ1, allows
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20 The loss value obtained with the calibrated (TayR) is 35 percent
higher than the one obtained with the well-designed (TR). Therefore,
the “allowance interval” can also be understood as the parameter
set that results in a loss value that never exceeds the minimum by
more than 35 percent.
Table 5
Allowance Intervals for a Mistakenly Identified (TR) Over the Calibrated (TayR),
(LTR/L*) < (LTayR/L*) = 1.35
Allowance interval True value
One mistake
θ0 θ0 [ [0.28, 0.80] θ0 = 0.5
φ0 φ0 [ [0.24, 0.67] φ0 = 0.5
θ1 θ1 [ [0.016, 0.245] θ1 = 0.06
φ1 φ1 [ [0.002, 0.033] φ1 = 0.01
Two mistakes
θ0 with φ0 = 0.40 θ0 [ [0.42, 0.64] θ0 = φ0 = 0.5
θ0 with φ0 = 0.25 θ0 [ [0.48, 0.52] θ0 = φ0 = 0.5
φ0 with θ0 = 0.40 φ0 [ [0.42, 0.61] θ0 = φ0 = 0.5
φ0 with θ0 = 0.25 [ θ0 = φ0 = 0.5a greater margin for an identification error without
causing severe damage to the stabilizing perform-
ance. Medium-size mistakes (θ1= 0.02 or θ1= 0.10)
result in moderate increases of the loss value,
which remains lower than the value obtained with
(TayR). The consequences of making one identi-
fication mistake on θ1 are only grave when the
parameter is assumed to be much lower than its
real value (see θ1 approaching zero in the bottom
left panel of Figure 4). Summarizing, the allowance
ranges for making mistakes in specifying θ1 or φ1
while still preferring (TR) to the calibrated (TayR)
are, respectively, θ1 [ [0.016, 0.245] and φ1 [
[0.002, 0.033]. Therefore, the allowance interval
is substantially narrower for the (AS) slope coef-
ficient φ1.
Our second policy exercise consists of assum-
ing that the central bank makes mistakes in iden-
tifying both backward-looking parameters, θ0 and
φ0, while the slope coefficients, θ1 and φ1, are
correctly estimated (see Table 6 and Figure 5).
Actually, one of the misidentifications is set to
be rather small by setting the parameter at either
0.40 or 0.25 instead of its true value, 0.50. The
other wrong parameter takes a value within the
set [0.0, 0.25, 0.75, 1.0] in Table 6 and the full
range of possible values in Figure 5. The overall
impression perceived in Table 6 is that the imple-
mentation of a (TR) with two identification mis-
takes always leads to significant increases in the
variability of inflation and the output gap relative
to optimal policy while the interest-rate variability
decreases. The deviations are quantitatively large
in all the cases, even in those with smaller identi-
fication mistakes. For example, when θ0 = 0.40
and φ0 = 0.25 instead of their true values at 0.50,
the inflation and output gap standard deviations
are, respectively, 60 percent and 52 percent higher
than the ones obtained with the optimal (well-
identified) policy. By jointly looking at Table 4
Casares
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Table 6
Stabilizing Performance of (TR) with Two Mistakes on Parameter Identification
Relative to Either Optimal Policy (denoted by superscript *) or Taylor Rule (denoted by superscript TayR)
Mistakes in θ0 and φ0, Relative standard deviations Relative loss value










θ0 = 0.40 (–0.10),   φ0 = 0.0  (–0.50) 1.89 1.72 0.34 1.55 1.49 0.32 2.50 1.85
θ0 = 0.40 (–0.10),   φ0 = 0.25 (–0.25)  1.60 1.52 0.47 1.31 1.32 0.45 1.88 1.39
θ0 = 0.40 (–0.10),   φ0 = 0.75 (+0.25)  1.96 1.23 1.11 1.61 1.07 1.05 2.63 1.95
θ0 = 0.40 (–0.10),   φ0 = 1.0 (+0.50)  5.25 3.61 1.07 4.30 3.14 1.01 17.3 12.8
θ0 = 0.25 (–0.25),   φ0 = 0.0 (–0.50) 2.06 1.80 0.25 1.69 1.56 0.24 2.91 2.15
θ0 = 0.25 (–0.25),   φ0 = 0.25 (–0.25)  1.79 1.60 0.36 1.47 1.39 0.34 2.24 1.66
θ0 = 0.25 (–0.25),   φ0 = 0.75 (+0.25) 4.83 3.31 1.02 3.96 2.87 0.97 14.6 10.8
θ0 = 0.25 (–0.25),   φ0 = 1.0 (+0.50)  3.77 2.89 0.39 3.09 2.51 0.37 9.16 6.78
φ0 = 0.40 (–0.10),   θ0 = 0.0 (–0.50) 1.58 1.35 0.47 1.30 1.17 0.45 1.74 1.29
φ0 = 0.40 (–0.10),   θ0 = 0.25 (–0.25) 1.50 1.36 0.51 1.23 1.18 0.48 1.62 1.20
φ0 = 0.40 (–0.10),   θ0 = 0.75 (+0.25)  1.76 1.25 0.83 1.44 1.08 0.79 2.12 1.57
φ0 = 0.40 (–0.10),   θ0 = 1.0 (+0.50)  2.13 1.43 0.71 1.75 1.24 0.67 2.91 2.15
φ0 = 0.25 (–0.25),   θ0 = 0.0 (–0.50) 1.85 1.58 0.33 1.52 1.37 0.31 2.34 1.73
φ0 = 0.25 (–0.25),   θ0 = 0.25 (–0.25)  1.79 1.60 0.36 1.47 1.39 0.34 2.24 1.66
φ0 = 0.25 (–0.25),   θ0 = 0.75 (+0.25) 2.25 1.69 0.49 1.85 1.47 0.46 3.28 2.43
φ0 = 0.25 (–0.25),   θ0 = 1.0 (+0.50) 2.25 1.61 0.34 1.85 1.40 0.32 3.20 2.37and Table 6, one can realize that making a single
“large” mistake such as θ0 = 0.0 in Table 4 is
roughly equivalent to making two “small” mis-
takes such as θ0 = 0.40 and φ0= 0.25 in Table 6. The
standard deviations and loss function ratios are
similar in both cases. Thus, allowing the central
bank to make two identification mistakes implies
that the stabilizing performance of the wrong (TR)
is substantially poorer than the one with a single
mistake. If we compare its performance with that
of the model-invariant (TayR), we come to the
conclusion of recommending the implementation
of (TayR) when there is moderate uncertainty on
both θ0 and φ0. In the last column of Table 6 the
ratio L
TR/L
TayR is always clearly greater than 1,
which means that the loss value when applying
(TayR) is significantly lower than the loss value
obtained by applying the mistakenly identified
(TR). With one mistake (see Table 4), L
TR/L
TayR
was greater than 1 in 10 of 16 total cases.
The same conclusion is reached by looking at
the graphical display of Figure 5. The plots show
that the deviation from optimal policy (measured
by the loss value ratio defined above) rapidly rises
as the parameters deviate from their true value
(0.5).21 The ratios are higher as the model param-
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(TR) with φ0= 0.50
(TR) with φ0= 0.40
(TR) with φ0= 0.25
(TayR)
(TR) with θ0= 0.50
(TR) with θ0= 0.40
(TR) with θ0= 0.25
(TayR)
Figure 5
Performance of Targeting Rules When Either One Parameter (solid lines) or Two Parameters
(dashed and dash-dotted lines) Are Mistakenly Identified
21 The solid lines of Figure 5 represent cases with only one identifi-
cation mistake. Accordingly, the solid line in the upper panel of
Figure 5 is also shown in the upper-left panel of Figure 4. Likewise,
the solid line in the lower panel of Figure 5 is also displayed as
the upper-right panel of Figure 4.eters deviate more from their true value (compare
dashed and dash-dotted lines in the two panels of
Figure 5). Meanwhile, the loss value ratio relative
to optimal policy when implementing (TayR) is
represented by a flat (dotted) line in Figure 5
because its design is independent of the model
parameters. With two identification mistakes,
(TR) performs better than the model-independent
(TayR) only if the mistakes are very small. The
allowance intervals can be seen from Figure 5 as
the parameter interval in which the loss value
ratio with (TR) is below the dotted horizontal line.
As Table 5 informs, these allowance intervals are
clearly narrower than the ones found under a
single identification error.
In review, our simulation results give support
to the use of a model-dependent targeting rule for
monetary policy design only if the central bank has
little uncertainty on the identification of the true
parameters of the (AD)-(AS) model. By contrast,
a moderate uncertainty on model parameters (e.g.,
significant errors in the two backward-looking
coefficients) can result in a substantial increase
of macroeconomic instability. In such situations,
a model-independent rule such as (TayR) is more
appropriate for monetary policy conduct because
of its better stabilizing performance.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has examined the influence of
model parameters on monetary policy design
under targeting rules. The reference model con-
sists of one pair of (AD)-(AS) equations that allow
for both backward-looking and forward-looking
dynamics on both inflation and the output gap.
Using Woodford’s timeless perspective approach,
we derived the targeting rule for the hybrid
(AD)-(AS) model as a nine-term reaction function
of the nominal interest rate. Coincidently, the
targeting rule resembles Taylor’s (1993) famous
policy prescription: The nominal interest rate must
positively respond to current fluctuations of infla-
tion and the output gap. Also, the reaction func-
tion for the nominal interest rate includes rich
internal dynamics (with coefficients on two lags,
two leads, and its expected value computed one
period ago) and a reaction to one lag and one lead
of the output gap.
The analysis of the influence of the model
parameters on the monetary policy design was
implemented in two different scenarios. First, it
was assumed that the central bank can exactly
identify the true values of the model parameters
(in the section on sensitivity analysis in a well-
specified model). In this case, the degree of
backward-lookingness of either inflation or the
output gap is key for the optimal design of mone-
tary policy. Thus, a “counterbalance assign-
ment” was set: Monetary policy should be more
backward-looking when either inflation or the out-
put gap are more forward-looking, and monetary
policy should turn more forward-looking when
either one happens to be more backward-looking.
This result is an extension of similar policy rec-
ommendations from Giannoni and Woodford
(2003), Smets (2003), and Leitemo (2006). The
role of other model parameters (slope coefficients
in (AD)-(AS) and central-bank policy parameters)
is limited in determining the response coefficients
involving inflation or the output gap because
these parameters have no practical influence on
the internal interest-rate dynamics.
The second policy scenario incorporates the
possibility that the central bank makes mistakes
when identifying the parameters of the (AD)-(AS)
equations (see the previous section). With such
uncertainty, the model-dependent targeting rule
is no longer optimal because it contains the
identification error. As a result, the stabilizing
performance of the targeting rule may worsen in
a significant way. As expected, the stabilizing
capacity of the targeting rule is poorer with larger
identification mistakes. This scenario may lead
the central bank to conduct monetary policy with
a model-independent rule. Concretely, some
simulation exercises show that a calibrated Taylor-
type rule performs better than the targeting rule
in cases of moderate or severe uncertainty on the
coefficients of the (AD)-(AS) equations. This find-
ing can be understood as a call for a more cautious
monetary policy design when there is model
uncertainty. It brings back the old prescription
from Brainard (1967), contradicting the opposite
recommendation recently found in the literature
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Optimality Discussion
As argued by Jensen and McCallum (2002), Woodford’s “timeless perspective” targeting rule (TR) is
suboptimal if the optimality criterion is to minimize the unconditional expectation of the loss function
(L). The optimal (Jensen-McCallum) rule for that case can be obtained from the timeless perspective
rule when eliminating the discount factor in the central-bank optimizing program, i.e., setting β = 1.0.
In practical terms, the Jensen-McCallum rule and the timeless perspective rule are very much alike
because they differ only in the treatment of the central-bank discount factor. Thus, the (TR) according
to the Jensen-McCallum criterion would be
(TR′)
The coefficients are very similar to the ones in (TR), although they are not exactly the same. The
deviation between the performance of (TR) and (TR′) is quantitatively very small. Taking the uncondi-
tional expectation of the loss function under the baseline calibration (β = 0.99), the loss value ratio is
LTR/LTR′ = 1.0012, which implies that the loss value with (TR) is only 0.12 percent higher than the loss
function value with (TR′). For related issues on monetary policy optimality, see McCallum (2005).
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